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Abstract
There has over the decades been a recrudescence of francophobia in many 
francophone African countries. This has attracted the attention of scholars across 
the world and has fuelled a discourse which has myopically constructed 
francophone Africans’ francophobic sentiments either as a purely xenophobic 
movement or a nationalist feeling. Meanwhile, for many members of the African 
diasporas and intelligentsia, francophobia is essentially an expression of their pan-
African convictions. In effect, for many francophone pan-African political activists, 
the act of fighting and mitigating neocolonialism in their countries is inextricably 
tantamount to exhibiting francophobic sentiments. Such an act is also tantamount 
to deploying various forms of animosity against France. This is so perhaps 
because France is arguably perceived as the most dominant neocolonial force in 
their countries. In this paper, this popular trend is illustrated with close respect to 
the Cameroonian experience. Using secondary sources and critical observations, 
the paper specifically looks at how various manifestations of French neocolonialism 
have given birth to waves of anti-French sentiments among the intelligentsia and in 
the media; and how this anti-French feeling is mostly expressed in the name of 
Pan-Africanism. The paper thus examines how Pan-Africanism has, to both the 
Cameroonian intelligentsia and the media, meant adopting a virulent anti-French 
discourse or rhetoric. In line with this central objective, the paper answers three 
principal research questions: what body of evidence proves that there is French 
neocolonialism in Cameroon? How has French neocolonialism engendered a 
virulent pan-African discourse that is basically anti-French? And how has this pan-
African francophobic discourse been observed or manifested among the 
Cameroonian intelligentsia and in the country’s private media? 
Keywords: Anti-French sentiment, neocolonialism, Pan-Africanism, nationalist media, domination, 
Françafrique. Cameroon
Introduction: Pan-Africanism and the imperative of being anti-French
Be it subtle or evident, foreign dominance has hardly, if not never, been welcome in countries 
across the world. Nations have always developed the “instinct” and reflex of denouncing and 
resisting any form of external dominance, especially when such dominance becomes politically, 
economically and/or culturally asphyxiating. In tandem with this, most Third world and non-
Anglophone nations have tended to interpret the phenomenal globalization of “very powerful” 
1.  Floribert Endong PhD is a lecturer in the Department of  Theatre, Film and Carnival Studies,  University of Calabar, 
Nigeria.
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Anglo-Saxon cultures (notably Americanism) as a threat to their own cultures and ideologies. In 
France, for instance, the government has in both gentle and aggressive ways resisted the 
American cultural and ideological domination. France has done this by sometimes resorting even 
to what many scholars have called anti-Americanism. Meunier (2009) notes for instance that, by 
leading the anti-globalisation movement in the 1990s and by championing the movement against 
the war in Iraq in 2003, France has over the years confirmed its status of “old enemy among 
America’s friends”. Meunier further observes that “even before the days of Chirac and De Gaulle, 
France had always seemed to be at the forefront of animosity toward the United States – from 
eighteenth-century theories about the degeneration of species in the New World to twentieth-
century denunciations of the Coca-Colonization of the Old World” (Meunier 2009:129). In the 
same line of argument, Herrmann and Kertzer (2015) have argued that although not that 
pronounced, anti-Americanism has always been part of the French popular cultures and lore. In 
their words, “the more attached the French are to their country, the more of a break they give the 
United States compared to other great powers who behave similarly” (Herrmann & Kertzer 
2015:1). 
In the same way, France has perceived American cultural and ideological “dominance” as a 
threat to its own culture and as an “ill” to energetically combat (sometimes with strong anti-
Americanism), so too have many of its former colonies viewed its domination of various sectors 
of their economies as an equation to solve with anti-French sentiments. Thus, growing and 
perceptible waves of francophobic sentiments have since the decolonisation period prevailed in 
many, if not all francophone African countries, begging for scholarly and political attention 
(Soumare & Konan 2019; Roger 2019; Survie 2019).    
This growing wave of anti-French sentiments observed in Francophone African countries 
has variously been reviewed and interpreted by politicians, researchers, sociologists, 
philosophers and anthropologists, among other observers. At least two schools of thought have 
attempted to theorise the phenomenon (francophobia), mostly taking into consideration its local 
or national colorations, its roots and French/Western institutions’ attitudes towards it. The first 
school of thought – which I technically call the “skeptical school” – has interpreted the 
phenomenon either as a mere myth, a political rumor not backed by substantial empirical 
evidence or a minor dilemma not deserving elaborate attention. An egregious adept of this 
school of thought is General Secretary of the Franco-African Summit, Mme Stephanie Rivoal 
(cited in Myer 2019) who views the myth of the recrudescence of the francophobia movement in 
francophone Africa more as a hastened generalisation and simplification of French political and 
military presence in the continent as a whole and in francophone African countries in particular. 
In an interview granted to the tabloid Point Afrique, she claims that it is surely faulty to present 
anti-French sentiments in Africa as a strictly generalised phenomenon. The French diplomat 
anchors her position in her personal observation and her personal experience with African 
businessmen, politicians and technocrats. She claims that her numerous visits on African soil 
have informed her that many Africans rather greet French presence in their territories with much 
hope and euphoria. In her language, the allegations of a growing anti-French sentiment in Africa 
should very much be taken with a pinch of salt:
Let us face concrete facts. Anti-French sentiments are not a generalized phenomenon in 
Africa. In all African countries that I have once visited, people have repeated told me 
“you Frenchmen need to come again and invest in our countries” [My translation]1 (cited 
in Mayer 2019: para 2)  
In the same line of argument, a French diplomat cited in Roger (2019:49) claims that the myth of 
a recrudescent anti-French sentiment in francophone countries is just a negligible phenomenon 
1.  Parlons de faits concrets. Le sentiment anti-français est loin d'être généralisé à l'ensemble de l'Afrique. Partout où je 
vais, on me dit : venez investir davantage dans nos pays.
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that should not, for now, be seen as a call for alarm. In his language, the phenomenon “is like the 
cries of mosquitoes. You hear them around you in the advent of the night. You also feel their 
presence around you; but you need not be worried for now” [my translation]1.
If Rivoal on one hand and her French counterpart cited in Roger (2019) on the other hand 
do not totally negate the existence of francophobic feelings in Africa, many of their African peers 
and contemporaries categorically relegate the thesis of such francophobic feeling to a lie, a post- 
truth or a mirage mostly evoked to discredit France or create a fictive lack of entente between 
France and its former colonies. One easily finds this category of observers among African 
leaders, particularly those that have – or pretend to have – some strong affinities with French 
multinationals or political institutions. In line with this, Roger (2019) quotes Boubacar Keita as 
suggesting that far from being driven by anti-French sentiments, citizens of francophone 
countries in the Sahel region view French military presence in their respective countries as a 
demonstration of French solidarity that can only be welcome and be popularly considered as a 
strategic action in the ongoing fight against radical Islamism and terrorism in the region. After a 
French helicopter crashed and caused the death of 13 French soldiers in the Sahel region, 
president Keita wrote his French counterpart saying: 
I can assure you that in spite of the impatience and frustrations sincerely or maliciously 
expressed here and there, the peoples in the Sahel region remember and continue to 
exclusively underscore the solidarity which they enjoy from French troops”. [My 
translation]2 (cited in Roger 2019:26). 
Contrary to the "skeptical school", the second current (the “non-skeptical” school) confirms the 
existence of an ever growing wave of anti-French sentiments in francophone Africa. This non-
skeptical school attributes the anti-French sentiment to a multitude of factors, principal among 
which are the sequels of French colonialism and neocolonialism clearly manifested by the 
continuous existence of a colonial currency in Francophone African countries (the CFA Francs), 
the prevalence of colonial patterns of trade between France and its former colonies, and 
France’s military presence and constant political interference in the internal affairs of African 
French-speaking countries (Pigeaud & Sylla 2018; Mbog 2020; Crux 2020; Chimtom, 2020). 
Adepts of the "non-skeptical" school argue that France’s continuous socio-cultural and political 
domination in French-speaking countries in particular and in Africa in general has made it the 
major problem of the “Dark Continent”, as well as the greatest threat to the continent’s socio-
economic development. Cameroon’s separatist movement, the Ambazonia Prisoners of 
Conscience Support Council (2019:9), states this theory plainly, when it declares in its report 
titled History and Context that:
Kenneth Kaunda [once said]: “There is a devil in Africa! That devil is called France.” For 
Africans in former British colonies, as well as for most activists and allies in non-French 
speaking countries across the globe, Kaunda’s statement does not compute. We are too 
used to focusing on the “big bad guy” and France doesn’t seem like him. But for Africans 
who have experienced life within the skeleton of France’s colonial legacy, these words 
ring true without explanation.
In effect, French continuous – but un-avowed – political, economic and military domination 
in its former African colonies has triggered the emergence of all manner of both underground and 
overt nationalist movements which have rooted their mantras in French-bashing and anti-French 
agitations. Thus, in many francophone African countries, the perceived evidence of French 
neocolonialism – manifested by French military presence, pro-French economic policies, the 
domination of French multinationals, the prevalence of colonial currencies (the CFA Francs or 
1.  C’est comme les moustiques à la nuit tombée : il y a un bruit de fond gênant, mais rien de bien méchant pour l’instant 
2.  Je puis vous assurer qu’en dépit des impatiences observées, des frustrations exprimées çà et là, qu’elles soient sin-
cères ou feintes, les peuples du Sahel ne retiendront et ne magnifieront que la solidarité dont elles bénéficient aujo-
urd’hui de la part des forces françaises
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Françafrique) and France’s purported pernicious alliance with unpopular ruling elites among 
others – have turned out to fuel massive anti-French sentiments in various Francophone African 
countries. In his paper titled “The anti-French sentiment in Africa”, Roger (2019) particularly 
stresses that this francophobia stems from popular beliefs and various forms of conspiracy 
theories that associate French military presence in the Sahel with neocolonial ploys aimed first 
and foremost at protecting French interests against local peoples’ own interests in the sub-
region. By such conspiracy theories France is less enthusiastic in wiping out the djihadist 
menace in the Sahel because the cultivation of a chaotic atmosphere in the Sahel can only justify 
France’s military and political presence in the region and thus work in the favour of Emmanuel 
Macron’s France. 
A striking issue in the manifestations of francophobia in francophone Africa is that the anti-
French sentiments most often take a concrete shape under so-called pan-Africanist or Afro-
optimist political movements. In other words, many of the pressure groups and political entities 
that formally express anti-French feelings tend to anchor their sentiments in pan-Africanist or 
Afro-optimist ideals or in some form of unstructured movement or rhetoric that resemble these 
ideals. A case in point is French-Beninese activist Kemi Seba who, in guise of defending pan-
African ideals, initiated a digitally driven campaign that has remained bent on caricaturing the 
CFA Franc as an instrument of French neocolonialism in francophone Africa as well as a channel 
through which France perpetually and insidiously keeps its former colonies in ‘economic slavery’ 
(Bax & Monnier 2017; Chutel 2017). Another case in point is the Suisso-Cameroonian activist 
Nathalie Yamb who, under the impulse of an aggressive anti-French pan-Africanism, has on 
multiple occasions multiplied animosities against the French government and the French 
nationality. During the 2019 Russo-African Submit held in Sotchi, she censured France, noting 
that: 
France continues to view the African continent as its propriety. We want to dump the 
CFA Franc which Paris, with the complicity of its Africans stooges, insists on maintaining 
under the name “Eco” […] We demand the dismantling of French military bases which 
exclusively enable the pillage of our resources […] and supports the continuous stay of 
dictators at the head of our States [my translation]1 (cited in Soumaré & Konan 2019:62) 
Thus, to many francophone pan-African political activists, the act of denouncing, fighting or 
checking neocolonialism in their countries or continent is inextricably tantamount to exhibiting 
francophobic sentiments and deploying forms of animosity against France. This has been so, 
perhaps because France is arguably the most dominant neocolonial force in their countries as 
well as in the entire African continent (Ambazonia Prisoners of Conscience Support Council 
2019; Pigeaud & Sylla 2018). The fact that many francophone Africans use francophobia as a 
tool to express their pan-African or Afro-optimist convictions has not really attracted the attention 
of scholars. Most of the research works that have devoted their attention to francophobia in 
francophone African countries have tended to present this francophobic sentiment either as an 
essentially xenophobic or nationalist tendency. There is therefore a great need to illustrate how 
African francophobia is not essentially xenophobic or just nationalist, but an expression of a 
bigger philosophic-political movement (Pan-Africanism).   
In this paper, the above is done in the light of the Cameroonian experience. Using 
secondary sources and critical observations, the paper specifically looks at how various 
manifestations of French neocolonialism have given birth to waves of anti-French sentiment 
among the Cameroonian intelligentsia and in the media. The paper also looks at how the above- 
mentioned anti-French sentiments are mostly expressed in the name of Pan-Africanism. The 
1.  La France considère toujours le continent africain comme sa propriété. Nous voulons sortir du franc CFA, que Paris, 
avec la complicité de ses laquais africains, veut pérenniser sous l’appellation éco », […] Nous voulons le démantèlement 
des bases militaires françaises qui ne servent qu’à permettre le pillage de nos ressources (…) et le maintien de dicta-
teurs à la tête de nos États.
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paper thus examines how Pan-Africanism has, to many members of the Cameroonian 
intelligentsia and media, meant adopting a virulent anti-French discourse or rhetoric. In line with 
this central objective, the paper answers three principal research questions: how true is the belief 
that there is French neocolonialism in Cameroon? How has French neocolonialism engendered 
a virulent pan-African discourse that is basically anti-French? And how has this pan-African 
francophobic discourse been observed or manifest both among the country’s intelligentsia and 
media?  
French neocolonialism in Cameroon: reality or myth?
By definition, neocolonialism is a paradoxical situation where a country is de jure independent 
but continues in various insidious ways to be under the political, economic and cultural control of 
its former colonial master, a foreign power, a powerful international body or specific foreign 
multinationals. It is also a system that emanates from a vicious alliance between the former 
colonial power and the ruling class of the ex-colony. Such an alliance has as main target to 
predominantly defend or protect the economic and cultural interests of the former colony or its 
multinationals, to the detriment of the local/African population (Martins, 1995). Many sources 
have sought to illustrate neocolonialism in Cameroon. A review of these sources reveals that at 
least three Western and Asian powers have over the years exerted neocolonial control over the 
Cameroonian government or the country as a whole. These powers include the United States of 
America, China and most especially France (Mayers, Nguiffo & Assembe-Mvondo 2019; 
Jansson 2009). According to Survie (2009; 2019), Haag (2011), Pigeau and Sylla (2018) and 
Mbog (2020), France is pre-eminent among neocolonisers in Cameroon. 
The myth of French neocolonialism in Cameroon is rooted in a plurality of factors, one of 
which is the fact that, since independence, Cameroon has continued to maintain colonial 
patterns of trade with France. Although Cameroon has generally been open to international 
trade, it has in most years made France its main, or one of its principal trading partners. In 2009, 
France was Cameroon’s first trading partner with a commercial exchange of about 860 Million 
Euros which included 597 Millions of import from France and 263 Million of export to France (a 
negative trading balance) (Haag 2011). In 2018, France was second to China in the list of the five 
main trading partners of Cameroon (Societe Generale 2018). A number of trade agreements 
signed between France and Cameroon have been to the advantage of France and other 
members of European Union, and to the detriment of local industries in Cameroon. For instance, 
in 2016, Cameroon signed a free trade agreement with the European Union (of which France is a 
member). This agreement has been viewed as a system which removes the little protection local 
industries could have in Cameroon to the advantage of French and European Union domination 
of the Cameroonian market. 
Beside the colonial pattern of trade, Cameroon has – like other French speaking Africa 
countries – continued to use a colonial currency (the CFA Franc) introduced in its territory by 
France in the pre-independent period. Through this currency, France has exerted financial 
control over Cameroon. Not only is this currency guaranteed by France, Cameroon is obliged to 
deposit over 50% of its foreign earnings into an operational account in the French treasury. This 
requirement enables a huge outflow of capital which could have been used for Cameroon’s 
socio-economic development. Beside this, the currency is minted in Europe and managed by a 
central bank (Central African States Bank [BEAC]) which is also subtly controlled by France. In 
effect, decision on monetary policies in the Central African Monetary Community (of which 
Cameroon is member) can be taken only with the consent of France. France’s representation in 
the central bank of the CFA zone is not massive, but given the fact that decisions taken in the 
bank must be unanimous or enjoy a large majority, France has a de facto veto power in the 
decision-making machinery and the operations of the bank. 
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More palpable evidence of French neocolonial influence in Cameroon is the favourable 
treatment accorded to French multinationals in Cameroon, a treatment which in many cases has 
enabled them (the multinationals) to exhibit illegal and imperialistic tendencies in the country. 
Indeed, a number of French companies have capitalised on widespread corruption in Cameroon 
as well as on their alliance with some very influencial figures in the Cameroonian government to 
abusively exploit Cameroonian resources, evade taxes or violate the human rights of their local 
employees. A case in point is French multinational Sondiaa, which has constantly deployed 
illegal take-overs of local people’s landed proprieties for the creation or extension of its sugar 
cane plantations (Haag 2011; Survie 2019). Other egregious cases include Rougier, Coron and 
Bolloré which in all impunity have often employed mercenaries from the security engineering 
company Africa Security SARL to ruthlessly address incidents of protest mounted by their 
employees. Thus, many French multinationals operating in Cameroon have, with great impunity, 
or with the complicity of some influential officials of the Government, perpetrated human rights 
violations in Cameroon (Transparency International Cameroon 2018).
Sharing corollaries, Pigeaud (2009) cites several reports generated by Oxfam and The 
Catholic Committee for the Fight Against Hunger which reveal that the French corporation called 
‘Plantations of Upper Penja (PHP)’ has negatively distinguished itself by its constant violation of 
its workers’ human rights, the abusive treatment of its employees and the very low wages it pays 
its workers (about 60000 heads). In effect, its workers sometimes labour for more than 15 hours 
daily. Peageaud (2009) also notes PHP’s non-respect of environmental protocols, its involvement 
in fiscal evasion and unscrupulous entrepreneurial attitudes. PHP has for years embraced these 
questionable cultures without being reprimanded or sanctioned by the Cameroonian authorities, 
thanks to subtle bribery, corruption and in officious support of the government. As Pigeaud 
pointedly (2009:27) puts it,
PHP has the support of the region’s political, administrative and judicial authorities. “As 
a traditional leader, I receive a monthly salary from PHP, reveals a local authority. The 
Senior and Junior Divisional Officers similarly receive a pay from the company”. […] 
PHP “does anything it wants to whosoever it chooses to deal with. Its administration is 
capable of the worst, surmises a businessman who hails from Njombe and who proffers 
anonymity. [My translation]1  
Pigeau further explores some of the reasons why PHP and similar French corporations 
operating in Cameroon will perpetrate the most reprehensible fiscal, social and entrepreneurial 
cultures [?], yet will remain untouchable and rather ‘venerated’ giants in the Cameroonian polity. 
She observes that many members of PHP’s administration are top figures of the party in power in 
Cameroon. The company is member of the Cameroonian banana companies of Cameroon, a 
lobby headed by another important figure of the party in government and brother-in-law of the 
Minister of Commerce, Luc Magloire Mbarga Atangana. The latter doubles as the Chairman of 
PHP’s board of directors. Moreover, the company gives out its lands for rent to top Cameroonian 
army officers. The company enjoys a good relationship with the nation’s president as its 
employers are regularly sent to work on president Biya’s pineapple plantations. In view of all 
these factors, Pigeau (2009) associates the neocolonial policies of the company partly with the 
connections it has with the powers in Cameroon.
While a number of French multinationals enjoy the status of “untouchable” or neocolonisers 
thanks to their affinities with influential members of the party in government, others have such 
privileged status thanks to the support they provide to specific key government agencies or 
government projects. The French oil company Total for instance has for years sponsored the 
1.  PHP a les responsables politiques, administratifs ou judiciaires de la région dans sa poche. «En tant que chef tradition-
nel, je suis payé chaque mois par la PHP, confie une «élite» locale. Le sous-préfet, le préfet aussi. [...] PHP «fait ce 
quelle veut à qui elle veut», ses dirigeants «sont capables de tout», résume un homme d’affaires originaire de Njombé 
qui ne veut pas être identifiable.
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training and activities of the Cameroonian Navy in exchange for the protection of their petroleum 
platforms in the country (Haag 2011; Tache 2019).
France’s neocolonial control over Cameroon has also been greatly felt in the political realm. 
This has been seen both in instances where Cameroonian presidents openly declared their loyal-
ty or allegiance to France, and incidents where a French president, an influential politician or 
multinational from France sought to pressurise the Cameroonian president or government to-
wards executing a pro-French design. In one of his speeches to the public, Cameroon’s very first 
president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, manifested his loyalty to France saying: ‘How can we conceive hav-
ing other partners than this country [France]? How can we forget its accomplishment all these 
years that we have learned to understand and appreciate [it]’ (cited in Takoungang and Krieger 
1998:88). With the same measure of enthusiasm, Ahidjo’s successor President Biya told the 
French press in an interview in La Baule (France) that he (Paul Biya) ‘cannot disagree with the 
opinion of President Francois Mitterand’, and that he is ‘the best student of France’ (cited in Cen-
tre d’Etudes d’Afrique Noire 1999:234). Cameroon’s presidents have not only been ‘good stu-
dents or stooges of France’ but its protégés, according to popular perceptions. Many myths 
prevailing in Cameroon claim that most Cameroonian presidents have been France’s choice in 
presidential elections. It is for instance rumoured that France manipulated the 1992 presidential 
elections to ensure the victory of Paul Biya and hinder the election of an Anglophone at the head 
of the Cameroonian government. Archbishop Christian Tumi (one or Cameroon government’s 
staunchest critics) remarks for instance that: ‘every body knows that Fru Ndi1 won the election in 
1992. Who organized the coup? It was Mitterrand and I am citing something [French President 
François] Mitterrand said to Biya: “jamais un anglophone à Etoudi [meaning never should an 
Anglophone be allowed in Etoudi2”’ (cited in Chimtom 2018:17). Rumours like the one voiced 
above point to the fact that a number of Cameroonian people view France with a lot of suspicion.
Anti-French sentiments as Pan-African manifestations against French 
neocolonialism in Cameroon
The persistent prevalence of French neocolonialism has engendered sporadic waves of anti-
French sentiment in Cameroon. This anti-French sentiment has from time to time fueled 
Cameroon’s popular culture (urban music, literary productions, popular cinema, political 
discourse and media contents). However, rarely have Cameroonian authorities or French 
diplomats and French multinationals publicly recognised the existence of francophobia in the 
country. Even on occasions where the French government has unambiguously bashed its 
Cameroonian counterpart, there have hardly been official expressions of anti-French sentiments 
from the Cameroonian government. Recently for instance, President Emmanuel Macron claimed 
in a video that went viral on social media that he has successfully pressured President Paul Biya 
into liberating some opposition leaders and political opponents. Macron’s act quickly attracted 
the indignation of critics across Africa (Mbog 2020; Crux 2020). Nevertheless the Cameroonian 
government tended to overlook or downplay the issue, using the period to rather cowardly 
declare its loyalty to the French government. In a February 2020 press release issued in reaction 
to Macron’s pronouncement, Cameroon’s Minister of Communication Rene Emmanuel Sadi 
rather claimed that France is: ‘A country with whom Cameroon shares strong historical ties and 
1.  John Fru Ndi has for over two decades been the leader of the opposition in Cameroon. As leader of the Social Demo-
cratic Front (SDF), he lost the 1992 presidential elections in Cameroon; in favour of Paul Biya, the current Cameroonian 
Head of State who has been in power since 1982. Fun Ndi has witnessed his decline from this position of leader of the 
main opposition party in recent presidential elections, with Maurice Kamto’s Cameroon Renaissance Movement’s rise to 
prominence in the Cameroonian political landscape. Fru Ndi is from the Anglophone region of Cameroon, precisely from 
the North West Region of the country, an area believed to host ethnic nationalities (the Bamendas) that are in their 
majority hostile to President Paul Biya’s and Francophone rule in Cameroon.  
2.  Etoudi is the neighbourhood where the Cameroonian presidential palace is located. It is a synecdoche commonly used 
in Cameroon to mean the country’s presidential palace
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relations of friendship and cooperation. These relations are mutually beneficial and have always 
been founded on the sacred principles of State sovereignty and mutual respect’ [My translation]1
(Cited in Mbog, 2020:4)
The silence of the Cameroonian government and French politicians and diplomats on the 
issue of growing francophobia in Cameroon is both complemented and justified by the fact that 
rarely – if not never – has any case of physical/mortal aggression against French nationals or 
French interest been reported in the country. Apart from a small number of 1990s movements 
initiated by pressure groups to boycott French products, one has hardly witnessed popular 
manifestations against French economic interests in the country. Also, France and French 
tertiary institutions have since the beginning of the post-independence period (since 1960) 
continued to be an attractive destination for many Cameroonians seeking to further their 
university education abroad. As noted by the French ambassador to Cameroon Christophe 
Guilhou, (cited in Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères 2020), the number of 
Cameroonian nationals who seek admission to French universities grows yearly.
In spite of these positive developments, many sporadic manifestations of anti-French 
sentiment have surfaced in the country’s socio-political space, particularly following incidents of 
neocolonial attitudes of France towards Cameroon or rumours of France’s involvement in 
destabilising activities against Cameroon. On February 22, 2020 for instance, French President 
Emmanuel Macron made a suggestive remark on a video that went viral on social media. In the 
video Macron claimed that he had mounted sustained pressure on the Cameroonian president 
Paul Biya and compelled the latter to liberate a political opponent (Maurice Kamto) who was 
jailed in connection with post-election protests. In the same video, President Macron highlighted 
various political maneuvers he had deployed and was planning to leverage in order to further 
direct President Biya towards a peaceful handling of some security issues in Cameroon and a 
forceful liberation of other political prisoners. Word verbatim, he said:
I pressured Paul Biya and asked him to address the Anglophone crisis and issues 
pertaining to his political opponents. I told Biya we must not meet in Lyon if Kamto is not 
released. He (Kamto) was freed because we put pressure. And now, the situation is 
deteriorating again. I will call president Biya next week. We shall mount maximum 
pressure on him for him to put an end to this situation. I am fully aware and concerned 
about incidents of violence in Cameroon. These incidents of violence are unacceptable. 
I am doing my best. [My translation]2 (cited in Mbog 2020). 
This muscled and relatively macho act by Macron sparked virulent criticism from the 
Cameroonian public, as well as waves of anti-French manifestations in the country. While a 
certain number of observers promptly read Macron’s statement as the act of a supremacist or an 
‘inexperienced neocolonialist’, the majority of Cameroonian critics (according to literature 
available) viewed the pronouncement along with covert ploys by France, aimed at maintaining 
the Françafrique (France’s sphere of influence). In reaction to Macron’s declaration, various 
pressure groups organised anti-French protests targeting the Yaoundé-based premises of the 
French embassy to Cameroon as well as the Douala-based3 French consulate. 
1.  La France est « un pays avec lequel le Cameroun entretient des relations damitié et de coopération anciennes, étroites 
et mutuellement bénéfiques, et qui ont toujours été fondées sur les principes sacrés de la souveraineté des Etats et du 
respect mutuel  
2.  J’ai mis la pression sur Paul Biya pour qu’il traite le sujet de la zone anglophone et ses opposants. Je lui avais dit que je 
ne voulais pas le recevoir à Lyon tant que Maurice Kamto nétait pas libéré. Et il a été libéré parce quon a mis la pression. 
Et là, la situation est en train de se redégrader. Je vais appeler la semaine prochaine le Président Biya, on mettra le max-
imum de pression pour que cette situation cesse. Je suis totalement au courant et totalement impliqué sur les violences 
faites au Cameroun et qui sont totalement intolérables. Je fais le maximum 
3.  Yaoundé and Douala are two major Cameroonian cities. The former is the political capital of Cameroun while the latter is 
the economic capital of the country. 
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Macron’s viral declaration also fuelled an anti-French political discourse in the 
Cameroonian media and among the country’s intelligentsia. While most media houses that 
raised the issue multiplied various forms of aggressive rhetoric to describe Macron’s neocolonial 
attitude, a number of Cameroonian political ideologues and academics proffered analyses that 
associated Macron’s perceived ‘blunder’ not only with some jaw-dropping conspiracy theories 
but also with some of the most childish – but problematic – expressions of French imperial 
control of Cameroon. A university lecturer and political analysis (Mathias Eric Oyona Nguini) 
interpreted Macron’s act as evidence that:
There exists a pseudo-Cameroonian activism working in collaboration with some special 
forces towards imposing a new political clientele to Cameroon. This is done within the 
framework of a colonial democracy […] This activism aims to destabilize and overthrow 
the Cameroonian government. It is one of the instruments leveraged by intrusive neo-
imperial powers to create hybrid wars aimed at consolidating the neocolonial 
satellisation [My translation]1 (cited in Mbog 2020). 
In the same line of thought, Catholic clergyman Roman Kisi described Macron’s remarks as a 
sign of the recrudescence of French leaders’ colonial attitudes towards the Cameroonian govern-
ment. In an interview he granted the online tabloid Crux Magazine, the man of God conceded 
that Macron’s claims clearly show that he is not only ‘responsible for all the chaos in Cameroon’ 
but is also part of an insidious imperialistic system mounted by France and programmed to 
perpetually undermine Cameroonian leadership. This is suggested by the simple understanding 
that ‘if he [Macron] has ordered Kamto’s release and is now pressuring President Biya to release 
other political prisoners, it means that African leaders like Paul Biya are stooges’ (cited in Crux 
2020). It may not be totally out of place to suspect or argue that Cameroonian presidents have 
been stooges of their French counterparts. This is so as President Biya – just like his 
predecessor Ahmadou Ahidjo – have since the early parts of his rule declared his loyalty and 
even subservience to French presidents and France. In 1990, Biya declared to the press in La 
Baule (France) that ‘I cannot disagree with the opinion of President Mitterand that I am the best 
student of France’ (cited in Centre d’Etudes d’Afrique Noire, 1999:234).
Incidents like Macron’s remark somewhat serve as both a reminder and a spotlight. This is 
so as they easily draw the attention of the Cameroonian public to other socio-political problems 
popularly perceived to be the consequence of French neocolonial control over Cameroon. The 
incidents also fired members of the Cameroonian populace to variously exhibit pan-African 
sentiments, anchoring such sentiments in a plurality of social materials. In fact, most reactions to 
French neocolonial attitudes towards Cameroon have most often been coated with specific 
components of the pan-African ideology. Some of these components of the pan-African ideology 
include the African self-determination concept, the back-to-African-value movement, the African 
unity idiom and the worldwide Black Nationalism and socialism concepts. This is seen in most 
Cameroon separatist movements’ attitude towards French domination in Cameroon. The 
Ambazonian Prisoners of Conscience Support Network (2019) – one of the separatist groups 
currently campaigning for the creation of a break-away country called Ambazonia – for instance, 
has on various platforms anchored its activism in an anti-French type of Pan-Africanism. In its 
report/manifesto titled History and Context, the group has described its secessionist movement 
as a pan-African initiative aimed at challenging the ills of a political regime which is nothing other 
than ‘the French neocolonial regime in Cameroon’.
Like the Abmazonian Prisoners of Conscience Defence Council, the Archbishop of Douala, 
His lordship Christian Tumi (a staunch critic of President Paul Biya) holds French neocolonialism 
1.  Un activiste pseudo-camerounais, agent de services spéciaux travaillant pour imposer une nouvelle clientèle gouvern-
ante au Cameroun, dans le cadre factice d'une démocratie coloniale (…), agit contre le Cameroun pour le déstabiliser et 
renverser son gouvernement. Il est un de ces agents typiques que les puissances intrusives néo-impériales utilisent pour 
créer des guerres hybrides destinées à raffermir la satellisation néocoloniale.
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responsible for many of Cameroon’s socio-political and economic malaises. In an interview 
granted the local Cameroonian newspaper The Rambler for instance, the clergyman lists 
France’s interference in the political affairs of Cameroon among the major remote causes of the 
current Anglophone crisis. The man of God also holds French neocolonialism responsible for the 
pitiable economic state of Cameroon. He declares that: ‘what is creating the whole problem is the 
presence of France in Cameroon. Whereas the English people left, whereas they packed their 
boxes and everything and went away, Cameroon is controlled by France. That’s the problem” 
(Cited in Chimtom 2018:16).
Like Archbishop Tumi too, a good number of Cameroonian politicians and political analysts 
have by their observations, fuelled the myth that France is the principal ‘enemy’ of Cameroon 
and that putting an end to its meddling in the affairs of Cameroon is the only way Cameroon may 
achieve political and economic success. As noted by Atemengue in his book title Sortir le 
Cameroun de l’impasse [Saving Cameroon from impasse], many Cameroonian politicians have 
developed anti-French sentiments as a tactical political tool as well as for nationalist reasons. In 
an article titled “Cameroun: francophonie et populisme à la carte”, Dougueli George (2019) simi-
larly numbers the Mouvement Africain pour l’indépendence et la Nouvelle Démocratie (MANI-
DEM) – currently integrated into Cameroon’s opposition party called the Union of Cameroonian 
People (UPC) – as one of the opposition political forces which have used francophobia and con-
stant French-bashing as a pan-African strategic tool to win the hearts of the Cameroonian elec-
torate. The French critic further observes that Francophobia has thus progressively become a 
form of populism used by a number of Cameroonian politicians and pressure groups for political 
point-scoring. Dougueli writes that in populo-nationalist quarters as well as in secessionist move-
ments in Cameroon, francobobia is a kind of fashionable culture. It is viewed as being open to 
the world; as well as a channel for censuring France’s African policy, the ills of the Françafrique
and the troubling Cameroonian Diaspora living in France.
Anti-French sentiments in Pan-African media initiatives: the Cameroonian 
experience
It is an accepted premise that the media of mass communication do not only have a symbiotic 
relationship with the society in which they subsist, but they also reflect their society of origin in 
many respects. Following this theory, it is not surprising that anti-French sentiments have 
progressively permeated the popular culture and the media discourse in Cameroon right from the 
time of French colonial rule in the 19th century. It is on record that the nationalist press 
spearheaded by newspapers such as l’Effort Camerounais made anti-French reporting a key 
strategy in its advocacy for the independence of Cameroon. Decades after Cameroon’s 
independence, the anti-French rhetoric has remained perceptible in the Cameroonian media for 
reasons which range from the urge to denounce the ills and mistakes of French colonialism (that 
France has never recognised) to the imperative of expressing pan-African ideals. In line with the 
first motive mentioned above (the urge to denounce France’s unavowed colonial mistakes), 
journalist Hamna Mana of the Cameroonian tabloid Le Jour remarks that: 
Anti-French sentiments in Cameroon are anchored in one important factor: France has 
never acknowledged the fact that she has waged a war in 1950 against nationalist 
groups struggling for Cameroon’s independence. This failure on the part of France is 
fuelling Cameroonians’ rancour against the French government. The latter has not 
memorably appeased its former colony, hence the mix-ups. [My translation]1 (cited in 
Mbog 2015:7)
1.  Le sentiment anti-français sappuie sur un élément important : la France na jamais reconnu quelle avait mené une guerre 
au Cameroun dans les années 1950 contre ceux qui se battaient pour lindépendance. Ce déni entretient de la rancur, il 
ny a pas eu dapaisement mémoriel, doù tous ces amalgames
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Mana’s reading of the situation is plausible if one considers anti-French cinematic produc-
tions such as Jean Marie Teno’s 1992 documentary film titled Afrique je te plumerai (translatable 
as ‘Africa, I will Pluck you’). In this film Teno censures French colonialism in an acerbic way, hold-
ing it responsible for a French-instigated ‘cultural genocide’ in Cameroon. This genocide, accord-
ing to Teno, is the product of France’s introduction of Euro-centric socio-cultural and political 
paradigms (pro-French education, Euro-centric economic policies and anti-traditionalist and anti-
African worldview, etc.) which undermined and ultimately asphyxiated traditional Cameroonian 
societies and killed the African soul of the Cameroonian nation. According to Teno, France de-
ployed the Euro-centric paradigms mentioned above to technically inhibit an African-driven form 
of socio-cultural and economic development in the country. Going by this understanding, Teno 
ends up advocating a developmental model which on the one hand takes into account the fail-
ures of the past (France’s colonial mistakes) and on the other hand exorcises French socio-polit-
ical influence from the soul of Cameroon. He declares that: ‘I wanted to trace [the] cause and 
effect between the intolerable present and the colonial violence of yesterday to understand how 
a country could fail to succeed as a state which was once composed of well-structured, 
traditional societies’ (a segment of the voiceover of Teno’s Afrique je te plumerai). 
As earlier mentioned, a number of Cameroonian media houses or media practitioners 
justify their anti-French sentiments or rhetoric with their strong desire to defend pan-African 
ideals. Leading this category of media voices is the privately owned broadcaster Afrique Media, a 
TV station which has taken pride in labeling itself a pan-African broadcaster. In effect, of all 
Cameroonian media houses which fuel francophobia in Cameroon, Afrique Media is arguably the 
most vocal, vibrant and dynamic. This broadcaster has firmly rooted its editorial philosophy in 
denouncing neocolonialism in Africa (particularly in Cameroon and other Francophone 
countries), an endeavour which can only lead them to propound an anti-French rhetoric. 
As a francophobic media house, Afrique Media has non-hesitantly resorted to yellow 
journalism and various gutter reportorial practices to bash France. Most of its interactive 
programmes – notably “le debat Africain” (the African Debate), “le Merit Panafricain” (The Pan-
African Merit), “Bouquet Special” (Special Bouquet) and “Edition Speciale” (Special Edition) are 
forums where panelists and presenters create or use any opportunity to rain insults on France 
and her policies in Francophone Africa. The station’s director of programmes Patrick Eya 
confesses the station’s fervour to bash France at all costs when he says ‘nous avons choisi de 
dénoncer les injustices que la France fait subir au continent africain’ [we have chosen to 
denounce the injustices that France inflicts on the African continent] (cited in Mbog 2015). By this 
statement, and many similar ones, the station’s staff has on various platforms or media not 
denied their anti-French mantra.
Also acknowledging the Anti-French penchant of the station, another senior journalist 
working with Afrique Media, François Bikoro, confided that: 
Afrique Media does not deny the fact that it is bias in its treatment of issues bordering on 
pan-Africanism. It doesn’t also deny the fact that, its voice represents a counter-force to 
the mainstream media which are bent on propagating the Western ideology [...] Afrique
Media’s way of operating has nothing to do with journalism but opinion broadcast 
shaped according to the “African palaver model” [My translation]1 (Cited in Boungou 
2014).
In 2015, the station fuelled anti-French sentiments in Cameroon by naturalising a myth and by 
helping to propagate a conspiracy theory that presented France as the invisible hand that 
presently arms and tele-guides terrorist groups in Northern Cameroon. Actually, in a succession 
1.  Afrique média ne cache pas son parti pris pour les questions panafricaines et se veut une réponse aux médias main-
stream qui se font le devoir de véhiculer lidéologie occidentale [] Afrique média ne fait pas du journalisme, mais la com-
munication dopinion sur le modèle de la palabre africaine 
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of media reportages, the station argued that, given the fact that most of the weapons seized from 
the Boko Haram terrorist group are French-made, France should be the invisible hand arming 
the Boko Haram group and fueling terrorism in northern Cameroon (Pommerolle 2015). This anti-
French line of argument and aggressive rhetoric has landed Afrique Media in trouble with both 
the Cameroonian government and some French political institutions. In June 2015, for instance, 
the Cameroonian media regulatory organ the National Communication Council (NCC) 
suspended the media house and closed its Yaoundé and Douala offices over issues of hate 
speech against France and some other Western countries (Moki 2015). This suspension did not 
deter the station from pursuing an anti-French editorial policy and an adversarial posture vis-à-
vis France’s political allies or multinationals in Cameroon. In effect, in several situations where it 
was suspended in Cameroon, the station swiftly delocalised its pole of transmission to Malabo 
(Equatorial Guinea) and continued with more virulent French bashing. Thus, the station has 
continued to give the impression that pan-Africanism in media broadcasting is tantamount to 
francophobia. Thus, it has also perpetrated the now popular – but problematic – belief that anti-
French sentiments could be an efficacious weapon to combat French neocolonialism and 
support pan-Africanism in Cameroon.
Conclusion
Many years after independence, France’s presence has remained dominant – if not preeminent – 
in Africa in general and Francophone Africa in particular. Sources have demonstrated French 
involvement or interference in the affairs of both Anglophone and Francophone African countries, 
at different points in time, in the contemporary history of the continent. The Françafrique for 
instance has from its inception in the 1940s to date remained a seminal example of French 
economic control over Francophone African countries; while her continuous military presence in 
numerous Francophone countries (through the creation of military bases in Senegal, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Chad and Djibouti just to name a few) has given many observers the impression that it 
(France) has in no way envisaged the wisdom of leaving its colonies. This persistent French 
policy has also suggested that much of Francophone Africa has remained France’s sphere of 
influence or neocolonial territories. This objectionable state of affairs has not gone down well with 
many political activists and observers in Francophone Africa. 
These last years have thus witnessed renewed waves of anti-French sentiments and 
agitations in several French-speaking African countries from Mali to Cameroon. The anti-French 
sentiments have literally permeated the entire social discourse in these countries, most often 
taking the form of a pan-African rhetoric against Western neocolonialism. In this paper the author 
has argued that, to many Francophone African political activists, combating neocolonialism and 
exhibiting pan-Africanist tendency have come to mean nursing anti-French sentiments, perhaps 
because France is increasingly perceived as the pre-eminent neocoloniser in Francophone 
Africa. In Cameroon more specifically, the popular perception or representation of France as the 
most dominant neocoloniser is given credence. Several incidents of France’s interference in the 
political and economic life of the country have been established. Such incidents have triggered or 
resurrected anti-French campaigns rooted in Pan-African ideals. In the domain of media 
reporting, broadcasters like Afrique Media have, in view of the continued dominance of France in 
the country, tailored their mantras and editorial philosophies to dominantly sound anti-French. 
French bashing has thus become a pertinent way of exhibiting Pan-African feelings in the 
Cameroonian media and in the socio-political landscapes of the country.
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